The Call of the Wild Struggle Agains Domination and Technological Fix Summary
Читать по-русски
Vladimir Zelensky daily calls on Western leaders to establish a no-wing zone over Ukraine. In this regard, the West finds itself facing a moral rather than a political or military choice. The current state of Russia'southward military aviation leads to its daily weakening, the demoralization of the pilots, and an even greater isolation of the state. There are technical issues also: NATO fighter jets will non reach Kharkov.
Russian federation's war confronting Ukraine has been going on for two weeks now and has obviously gone far beyond Moscow's original plan. Since the first days of the state of war, the Ukrainian leadership and the public in Western countries accept been calling for the institution of a no-wing zone over Ukraine to finish the use of Russian military aircraft. Yet, the leaders of the The states and other NATO member states (and only these countries can, in theory, provide such a zone) have refused to take this step.
Despite supporting Ukraine with defensive weapons, equipment, and coin, the West is not prepared to act as a party which would coerce Moscow into peace through military strength. It is not only the W's political circumspection, but also the fact that the absence of such a zone weakens Russia militarily, politically, and morally more than its presence would accept washed. Besides, at that place are doubts equally to whether such a zone is in principle technically feasible for NATO aviation. Therefore, it is unsaid that Ukrainians themselves volition brand it as difficult as possible for Russia to use its aviation in the Ukrainian sky with the assistance of weapons supplied by the West.
Not a political, only a moral choice
Since the commencement of the war, Russia has lost a significant number of combat aircraft: photo and video footage confirms the loss of at least 13 aircraft and fifteen helicopters, while Ukrainians merits Russian federation has lost 49 aircraft and over eighty helicopters. Even at the low end, this is comparable to the full losses of the Russian air force during, for example, the outset Chechen war. In 1979-1989, in Afghanistan, the USSR kept losing an average of 12-13 airplanes per yr (in 1984-1988, summit annual losses reached 19-20 airplanes) and 30-33 helicopters. At the same time, deliveries of American human-portable air defense systems have but but begun, and Russian losses will be increasing with each subsequent day of the war.
What are Russia's production capabilities? In 2021 Russian regular army received more sixty new planes and helicopters of all types, and another 200 were upgraded (it oft simply means routine repairs). Thus, Russian federation's two-week losses, even at their bare minimum, are a third of the almanac production of the entire military aviation manufacture. And given the embargo on all equipment and components for the Russian armed services-industrial complex, imposed by the West and supported past Japan, Republic of korea, Taiwan and Singapore, it will be very difficult for Russian federation to brand up for these losses.
Wreckage of a helicopter shot downward in the Nikolayev region
Given the likely reject in exports, the chapters of aircraft and helicopter plants can exist re-oriented to the country'southward own needs, then the existing stock of spare parts, components and imported equipment will somehow support product in the face up of sanctions. On the other mitt, exports provide the Russian armed forces-industrial complex with an inflow of foreign currency - $13 billion a twelvemonth in 2020-2021 and nigh $15 billion a year in 2016-2019. In add-on, exports made it possible to partially compensate the costs in the interests of the Russian ground forces, as it traditionally pays less per unit of measurement of equipment than foreign customers.
Foreign experts notation the modest number of Russian shipping present at the battlefield. This can exist explained by both the shortage of precision-guided munitions (every bit evidenced by the increased apply of unguided aerial bombs), and Russia's lack of feel in conducting complex air operations. In Syria, a few dozen stock-still-wing and rotary-wing shipping fabricated just ane or 2 sorties a mean solar day. We see roughly the same intensity of aviation use in the war with Ukraine. Just a tertiary factor must also be taken into account: the shortage of target reconnaissance assets.
Mod warfare uses space reconnaissance: pilots demand to know where to wing and what to bomb. And while in recent years the Russian air and infinite forces have made upwards for the acute shortage of communication, navigation, and early alert satellites, optical, radar, and electronic reconnaissance satellites are however in short supply. Out of more than 100 Russian military satellites, but four are optical reconnaissance satellites, two more are radar reconnaissance satellites, and half-dozen more are maritime electronic reconnaissance satellites. And this deficit can exist compensated neither by reconnaissance aircraft, which are also in short supply, nor by professional air reconnaissance aircraft. Simply put, Russian aviation has footling idea of what to bomb. This advisory impotence stimulates air terror tactics confronting Ukrainian cities, when schools, hospitals, maternity hospitals, and elementary residential buildings are targeted and destroyed.
An astute lack of space intelligence stimulates air terror tactics confronting Ukrainian cities
Nether these circumstances, the question of a no-fly zone is no longer so much a political equally a moral selection for the West, as the tactics currently used tends to further weaken Russia'south political position and, along with losses, demoralize pilots.
As for the Iskander ballistic missiles, sea and land-based cruise missiles of the Kalibr family (Kalibr-NK, 9M728 and 9M729), and air-launched missiles (Kh-101), over 600 missiles have been used up in two weeks while the production capacity is limited. By indirect evidence, we can conclude that the rate of product for each blazon of Russian high-precision missile capable of hitting targets at distances of several hundred kilometers does non exceed twoscore-50 per yr (for comparison, the US Tomahawk missiles were produced at a rate of several hundred per year). Thus, in the two weeks of war, Russia has probably used upward most of the missiles produced in the contempo years, and information technology volition have to replenish these stocks in much less favorable economic and technological weather condition than in 2014-2021. In this state of affairs, Western policymakers may also proceed from the expediency of encouraging the maximum consumption past the Russian regular army of its hard-to-supplant missiles.
Technical (un)feasibility
Altitude is another factor. When NATO forces imposed a Un-mandated no-fly zone over Great socialist people's libyan arab jamahiriya in 2011, NATO shipping could accomplish the populated and urbanized areas in the n of the state inside minutes from their airfields in Sicily, and could travel hundreds of kilometers further south. During the operations by the international coalition or Israel in the skies over Syria, distances were not a serious obstruction either. The situation in the Ukrainian sky is different: NATO fighters taking off from the territory of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary or Romania could at best reach Kiev. That is, they could hypothetically ensure a no-fly zone only to the westward of the Dnieper. There is simply nothing to defend Kharkov that suffers from air raids - even for the latest-gen American F-35 fighters this metropolis is about across the combat radius. Moreover, the city is subjected non only to air raids but besides to arms fire directly from Russian territory, which makes the no-wing zone concept ill-suited for eastern Ukraine. Unless NATO planes are placed straight on Ukrainian airfields, which is politically unacceptable to U.s.a. and European politicians at this time.
It turns out that the only effective fashion to limit Russia'south domination in the skies over Ukraine is through mass deliveries of portable anti-shipping missile systems, which are relatively easy to master and use. In improver, current air tactics make Moscow more vulnerable to political, international-legal and moral pressure due to its use of prohibited methods of warfare. And this effect will get particularly relevant when it comes to the post-war settlement.
The Call of the Wild Struggle Agains Domination and Technological Fix Summary
Source: https://theins.ru/en/politics/249236